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Abstract
In this paper, we present a sequential decomposition algorithm to compute graphon mean-field equillibrium
(GMFE) of dynamic graphon mean-field games (GMFGs). We consider a large population of players sequentially
making strategic decisions where the actions of each player affect their neighbors which is captured in a graph,
generated by a known graphon. Each player observes a private state and also a common information as a graphon
mean-field population state which represents the empirical networked distribution of other players’ types. We consider
non-stationary population state dynamics and present a novel backward recursive algorithm to compute GMFE that
depend on both, a player’s private type, and the current (dynamic) population state determined through the graphon.
Each step in this algorithm consists of solving a fixed-point equation. We provide conditions on model parameters
for which there exists such a GMFE. Using this algorithm, we obtain the GMFE for a specific security setup in cyber
physical systems for different graphons that capture the interactions between the nodes in the system.
Index Terms
Graphon mean-field games, Markov Perfect equilibrium, Signaling
I. INTRODUCTION
Strategic interaction of interconnected agents has been an important topic of study for many decades and its
relevance has been increasing rapidly with the progress of internet penetration and smartphone devices in our
society. The recent decade has seen tremendous technological advancement in the field of networking applications
that has led to an unprecedented scale of interaction among people and devices such as in ride sharing platforms,
social media apps, cyber-physical systems, large scale renewable energy, electric vehicles, cryptocurrencies and
smart grid systems. For instance, the influence of social networks in the decision making of majority of individuals
is a known phenomenon. Most decisions by individuals from which products to buy to whom to vote for are
influenced by friends and acquaintances. The emerging empirical evidence on these issues motivates the theoretical
study of network effects with strategic agents. The analysis, design and control of such systems that involve strategic
interactions embedded in a networked environment could lead to more intelligent and efficient applications, and
can enhance our understanding of the mechanics of such interactions.
Many of the above mentioned applications of interest have following key features: (a) large number of strategic
players (b) dynamically evolving incomplete information, and (c) an underlying network. Game theory is a natural
choice to model such interactions where the payoffs obtained by individuals depend on the action of her neighbors.
2A shortcoming of the standard approach to solve dynamic network games with incomplete information is interde-
pendence of strategies of the players across time. Moreover, as the number of players become large as is the case
in many practical scenarios considered here, computing Nash equilibrium becomes intractable.
A. Relevant Literature
Maskin and Tirole in [1] introduced the concept of Markov perfect equillibrium (MPE) for dynamic games
governed by an underlying Markov decision process (MDP). The strategies thus computed depend on the present
state and not on the past trajectory of the game. In general, there exists a backward recursive methodology to
compute MPE of the game. Some prominent examples of the application of MPE include [2], [3], [4]. Ericson and
Pakes in [2] model industry dynamics for firms’ entry, exit and investment participation, through a dynamic game
with symmetric information, compute its MPE, and prove ergodicity of the equilibrium process. Bergemann and
Va¨lima¨ki in [3] study a learning process in a dynamic oligopoly with strategic sellers and a single buyer, allowing
for price competition among sellers. They study MPE of the game and its convergence behavior. Acemog˘lu and
Robinson in [4] develop a theory of political transitions in a country by modeling it as a repeated game between
the elites and the poor, and study its MPE.
In large population games, computing MPE with the methods specified above becomes intractable. Mean field
games (MFG) were introduced in Huang, Malhame´,and Caines [5], and Lasry and Lions [6] to model the strategic
interactions with large number of players. In such games, the individual agents have minimal impact of the overall
outcome of the game and so the agents track a mean distribution of states of other agents rather than their
actual states. MFGs is an excellent and a tractable model to study large population dynamic games of incomplete
information, and has been shown to be a good approximation of Nash equilibrium (or MPE) of the original game
as the number of players grow large (for instance see [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] and references therein).
Parise and Ozdaglar introduced the notion of graphon games [12] to model large population static network games,
where graphon is generative model of a large random graph inroduced by Lova¨sz in [13]. Caines and Huang in [14]
combined the ideas of mean-field equillibrium (MFE) and graphon games to define Graphon Mean field games
(GMFGs) where there are a large number of strategic agents with dynamic incomplete information who interact on
an underlying fixed network generated by a known graphon. GMFGs combine the idea of network games defined
through graphons and the mean field framework of describing multi agent homogeneous games and predicting
equilibrium in a tractable manner. Large network of nodes interacting with one another can be represented as
graphons and mean field games deal with the study of such large interaction among devices and people as agents
to analyze such systems to design and understand the behavior of such large scale interactions and their impact
on our society. The progress in research in the mean field domain have been restricted to cases where the agents
interacted in a perfect homogeneous environment and the interactions between the agents were assumed to be
uniform irrespective of the location of the agent in the network. What if, the population interaction was not uniform
and there was a measure of how the agents interacted with each other or in other words, the payoff and the transition
to the next state was conditional on the relative position of the agent in the network. The mean field distribution
would be affected by it so will the optimum policies and the Nash equilibrium thus generated. The theoretical basis
3for such a case has been provided in [14] which generalizes the idea of mean field games across the population
with different levels of interactions through GMFG. In this paper, we propose a sequential decomposition algorithm
to compute GMFGs by decomposing the problem across time, which reduces the complexity of computing GMFGs
from exponential to linear in time.
We consider a discounted infinite-horizon dynamic graphon mean-field game where there is a large population of
homogeneous players each having a private type. Each player sequentially makes strategic decisions and is affected
by other players in its neighborhood through a graphon mean-field population state. Each player has a private type
that evolves through a controlled Markov process as a function of the graphon, which only she observes and all
players observe a common population state which is the distribution of other players’ types. In such games, the
graphon mean-field state evolves through McKean-Vlasov forward equation given a policy of the players and the
graphon function. The equilibrium policy satisfies the Bellman backward equation, given the graphon mean-field
states. Thus to compute equilibrium, one needs to solve the coupled backward and forward fixed-point equation in
the graphon mean-field and the equilibrium policy.
In order to demonstrate the utility of our algorithm to compute the GMFE of a graphon mean field game for
varying graphons, we consider a cyber-security example of malware spread problem. A cluster of nodes in a network
of physical servers get infected by an independent random process. For each node, there is a higher risk of getting
infected due to negative externality imposed by other infected players. A graphon function is defined that quantifies
the effect of the effect of the state of other nodes in the network on the concerned node. At each time t, a node
privately observes its own state and publicly observes the population of infected nodes, based on which it has to
make a decision to repair or not. Upon taking an action, the transition of to the next state is governed by both
its individual action and the actions affected by the neighboring agents given by a graphon function. Using our
algorithm, we find equilibrium strategies of the players which are observed to be non-decreasing in the healthy
population state.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we present a model of the graphon mean field game, followed
by some preliminary result from our past research regarding MPE in strategic dynamic games. In section III, we
present our main results where we present algorithm to compute MPE for both finite and infinite horizon game,
and also present existence results. In section V, we show the simulation results for the cyber-security example
assuming different graphons and conclude in Section VI.
B. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realizations. For any variable, subscripts
represent time indices and superscripts represent player identities. We use notation −α to represent all players other
than player α i.e. −α = {1, 2, . . . i−1, i+1, . . . , N}. We use notation at:t′ to represent the vector (at, at+1, . . . at′)
when t′ ≥ t or an empty vector if t′ < t. We use a−αt to mean (a
1
t , a
2
t , . . . , a
i−1
t , a
i+1
t . . . , a
N
t ). We use the notation∑
x to represent both
∑
x and
∫
x
, and the correct usage is determined depending on the space of x. We remove
superscripts or subscripts if we want to represent the vector, for example at represents (a
1
t , . . . , a
N
t ). We denote the
indicator function of any set A by 1{A}. For any finite set S, P(S) represents space of probability measures on S
4and |S| represents its cardinality. We denote by P σ (or Eσ) the probability measure generated by (or expectation
with respect to) strategy profile σ. We denote the set of real numbers by R. For a probabilistic strategy profile
of players (σαt )i∈[N ] where probability of action a
α
t conditioned on µ
G
1:t, x
α
1:t is given by σ
α
t (a
α
t |µ
G
1:t, x
α
1:t), we
use the short hand notation σ−αt (a
−α
t |µ
G
1:t, x
−α
1:t ) to represent
∏
j 6=i σ
j
t (a
j
t |µ
G
1:t, x
j
1:t). All equalities and inequalities
involving random variables are to be interpreted in a.s. sense.
II. MODEL AND BACKGROUND
A. Graphon Mean Field Games
Let us consider a discrete-time large population sequential game with N homogeneous players with N → ∞.
The interactions between these N players are captured in a asymptotically infinite network graph represented as
a graphon. Graphons are bounded symmetric Lebesgue measurable functions W : [0, 1]
2
→ [0, 1] which can be
represented as weighted graphs on the vertex set [0, 1] such that G = {g (α, β) : 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1} [14]. It is similar to
an adjacency matrix defined over a 2-dimensional plane where each entry in the matrix is the measure of coupling
between the agents concerned.
In each period t ∈ [T ], where [T ] represents the time horizon, a player α ∈ [0, 1] observes a private type xαt ∈ X
and a common observation µGt , then takes an action a
α
t ∈ A and receives a reward R(x
α
t , a
α
t , µ
G
t ). The common
observation is an ensemble of the mean field distributions with respect to all agents α ∈ [0, 1] given as µGt = {µ
α
t }α
where
µαt (x) = P {x
α
t = x} (1)
with
∑Nx
i=1 µ
α
t (i) = 1. Player α’s type evolves as a controlled Markov process,
xαt+1 = f˜ [x
α
t , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α] + wαt . (2)
The random variables (wαt )α,t are assumed to be mutually independent across players and across time. We also
write the above update of xαt through a kernel, x
α
t+1 ∼ Q
α(·|xαt , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) which depends on the graphon function
gα = {g(α, β) : 0 ≤ β ≤ 1}.
The dynamics of the MDP are governed both by the local information as well as the global dynamics involving
the effect of the policy action of other players in the system. The idea of graphon is to capture the effect of the
actions of all the other players β ∈ [0, 1] on player α. In prior mean field research, it was assumed that there is
a perfect interaction between the players and also that these interactions were uniform. In [14], they provide a set
of differential equations that govern such interactions in the mean field setting. The functions below show how the
graphon is used in determining the effect of players on one another. The function f˜ in (2) is given as
f˜ [xαt , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α] = f0 (x
α
t , a
α
t ) + f
[
xαt , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α
]
(3)
where
f
[
xαt , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α
]
=
∫
β∈[0,1]
∑
xβ∈X
f
(
xαt , a
α
t , x
β
)
g (α, β)µβt (x
β)d(xβ)dβ (4)
5and f0 represent the local effect of the agent when it takes any action and is independent of the actions taken by
other agents. In the case, when the agents do not interact at all i.e. g(α, β) = 0, the markov process reduces only
to the function f0 ignoring the degenerate case when α = β.
At instant t, the player α observes the trajectory (µG1:t, x
α
1:t) and takes an action a
α
t according to a behavioral
strategy σα = (σαt )
t, where σαt : (µ
G)t×X t → P(A). We denote the space of such strategies as Kσ . This implies
Aαt ∼ σ
α
t (·|µ
G
1:t, x
α
1:t). We denote Z
t to be the space of population states µG1:t till time t. We denote H
α
t = Z
t×X t
to be set of observed histories (µG1:t, x
α
1:t) of player α.
For finite time-horizon game, GT , each player wants to maximize its total expected discounted reward over a
time horizon T , discounted by discount factor 0 < δ ≤ 1,
Jα,T := Eσ
[
T∑
t=1
δt−1R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)
]
. (5)
For the infinite time-horizon game, G∞, each player wants to maximize its total expected discounted reward over
an infinite-time horizon discounted by a discount factor 0 < δ < 1,
Jα,∞ := Eσ
[
∞∑
t=1
δt−1R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)
]
. (6)
B. Solution concept: MPE
The Nash equilibrium (NE) of GT is defined as strategies σ˜ = (σ˜
α
t )α∈[0,1],t∈[T ] that satisfy, for all α ∈ [0, 1],
E
(σ˜α,σ˜−α)
[
T∑
t=1
δt−1R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)
]
≥ E(σ
α,σ˜−α)
[
T∑
t=1
δt−1R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)
]
, (7)
For sequential games, however, a more appropriate equilibrium concept is MPE [1], which we use in this paper.
We note that an MPE is also a Nash equilibrium of the game, although not every Nash equilibrium is an MPE. An
MPE (σ˜) satisfies sequential rationality such that for GT , ∀α ∈ [0, 1] , t ∈ [T ] , h
α
t ∈ H
α
t , σ
α,
E
(σ˜ασ˜−α)
[
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α)|µG1:t, x
α
1:t
]
≥ E(σ
ασ˜−α)
[
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)|µG1:t, x
α
1:t
]
, (8)
NE and MPE for G∞ are defined in a similar way where summation in the above equations is taken such that T
is replaced by ∞.
III. A METHODOLOGY TO COMPUTE GMFGS
In this section, we will provide a backward recursive methodology to compute GMFGs for both GT and G∞.
We will consider Markovian equilibrium strategies of player α which depend on the common information at time t,
µGt , and on its current type x
α
t .
1 Equivalently, player α takes action of the form Aαt ∼ σ
α
t (·|µ
G
t , x
α
t ). Similar to the
common agent approach in [15], an alternate and equivalent way of defining the strategies of the players is as follows.
We first generate partial function γαt : X → P(A) as a function of µ
G
t through an equilibrium generating function
θαt : µ
G → (X → P(A)) such that γαt = θ
α
t [µ
G
t ]. Then action A
α
t is generated by applying this prescription function
γαt on player α’s current private information x
α
t , i.e. A
α
t ∼ γ
α
t (·|x
α
t ). Thus A
α
t ∼ σ
α
t (·|µ
G
t , x
α
t ) = θ
α
t [µ
G
t ](·|x
α
t ).
1Note however, that the unilateral deviations of the player are considered in the space of all strategies.
6For a given prescription function γαt = θ
α[µGt ], the graphon mean-field µ
G
t evolves according to the discrete-time
McKean Vlasov equation, ∀y ∈ X and ∀α ∈ [0, 1]:
µαt+1(y) =
∑
x∈X
∑
a∈A
µαt (x)γ
α
t (a|x)Q
(
y|x, a, µGt ; g
α
)
, (9)
which implies
µαt+1 = φ(µ
α
t , γ
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) (10)
µGt+1 = φ(µ
G
t , γt; g
α) (11)
A. Backward recursive algorithm for GT
In this subsection, we will provide a methodology to generate GMFE of GT of the form described above. We
define an equilibrium generating function (θt)t∈[T ], where θt : µ
G → {X → P(A)}, where for each µGt , we
generate γ˜t = θt[µ
G
t ]. In addition, we generate a reward-to-go function (V
α
t )t∈[T ], where V
α
t : µ
G×X → R. These
quantities are generated through a fixed-point equation as follows.
1) Initialize ∀µGT+1, x
α
T+1 ∈ X ,
V αT+1(µ
G
T+1, x
α
T+1)
△
= 0. (12)
2) For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀µGt , let θt[µ
G
t ] be generated as follows. Set γ˜t = θt[µ
G
t ], where γ˜t is the solution
of the following fixed-point equation2, ∀i ∈ [N ], xαt ∈ X ,
γ˜t(·|x
α
t ) ∈ arg max
γt(·|xαt )
E
γt(·|x
α
t )
[
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV αt+1(φ(µ
G
t , γ˜t; g
α), Xαt+1)|µ
G
t , x
α
t
]
, (13)
where expectation in (13) is with respect to random variable (Aαt , X
α
t+1) through the probability measure
γt(a
α
t |x
α
t )Q
α(xαt+1|x
α
t , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α). We note that the solution of (13), γ˜t, appears both on the left of (13)
and on the right side in the update of µGt , and is thus unlike the fixed-point equation found in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Furthermore, using the quantity γ˜t found above, define
V αt (µ
G
t , x
α
t )
△
= Eγ˜t(·|x
α)
[
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV αt+1(φ(µ
G
t , γ˜t), X
α
t+1)|µ
G
t , x
α
t
]
. (14)
Then, an equilibrium strategy is defined as
σ˜αt (a
α
t |µ
G
1:t, x
α
1:t) = γ˜t(a
α
t |x
α
t ), (15)
where γ˜t = θ[µ
G
t ].
In the following theorem, we show that the strategy thus constructed is a GMFGs of the game.
Theorem 1. A strategy (σ˜) constructed from the above algorithm is an MPE of the game i.e. ∀t, hαt ∈ H
α
t , σ
α,
E
(σ˜ασ˜−α)
[
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α)|µG1:t, x
α
1:t
]
≥
E
(σασ˜−α)
[
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)|µG1:t, x
α
1:t
]
(16)
2We discuss the existence of solution of this fixed-point equation in Section IV
7Proof. Please see Appendix A.
B. Converse
In the following, we show that every GMFE can be found using the above backward recursion.
Theorem 2 (Converse). Let σ˜ be a GMFE of the graphon mean field game. Then there exists an equilibrium
generating function θ that satisfies (13) in backward recursion such that σ˜ is defined using θ.
Proof. Please see Appendix C.
C. Backward recursive algorithm for G∞
In this section, we consider the infinite-horizon problem G∞, for which we assume the reward function R to be
absolutely bounded.
We define an equilibrium generating function θ : µG → {X → P(A)}, where for each µGt , we generate
γ˜t = θ[µ
G
t ]. In addition, we generate a reward-to-go function V : µ
G × X → R. These quantities are generated
through a fixed-point equation as follows.
For all µG, set γ˜ = θ[z]. Then (γ˜, V ) are solution of the following fixed-point equation3, ∀z ∈ µG, xα ∈ X ,
γ˜(·|xα) ∈ arg max
γ(·|xα)
E
γ(·|xα)
[
R(xα, Aα, µG; gα) + δV (φ(z, γ˜), Xα
′
; gα)|µG, xα
]
, (17)
V (z, xα) = Eγ˜(·|x
α)
[
R(xα, Aα, µG; gα) + δV (φ(µG, γ˜; gα), Xα
′
)|µG, xα
]
. (18)
where expectation in (17) is with respect to random variable (Aα, Xα,′) through the measure γ(aα|xα)Qα(xα
′
|xα, aα, µG).
Then an equilibrium strategy is defined as
σ˜α(aαt |µ
G
1:t, x
α
1:t) = γ˜(a
α
t |x
α
t ), (19)
where γ˜ = θ[µGt ].
The following theorem shows that the strategy thus constructed is a GMFE of the game.
Theorem 3. A strategy (σ˜) constructed from the above algorithm is a GMFE of the game i.e. ∀t, hαt ∈ H
α
t , σ
α,
E
(σ˜ασ˜−α)
[
∞∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)|µG1:t, x
α
1:t
]
≥
E
(σασ˜−α)
[
∞∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α)|µG1:t, x
α
1:t
]
, (20)
Proof. Please see Appendix D.
3We discuss the existence of solution of this fixed-point equation in Section IV
8D. Converse
In the following, we show that every GMFE can be found using the above backward recursion.
Theorem 4 (Converse). Let σ˜ be a GMFE the graphon mean field game. Then there exists an equilibrium generating
function θ that satisfies (13) in backward recursion such that σ˜ is defined using θ.
Proof. Please see Appendix F.
IV. EXISTENCE
In this section, we discuss sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution of the fixed-point equations (13)
and (17).
Assumption 1 (A1). The action set A is a compact set.
Assumption 2 (A2). f˜
[
xαt , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; gα
]
and R(xαt , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) are Lipschitz continuous in xαt and uniformly
continuous with respect to aαt .
Assumption 3 (A3). The first and second derivatives of f˜
[
xαt , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; gα
]
and R(xαt , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) with respect to
xαt are continuous and bounded.
Assumption 4 (A4). f˜
[
xαt , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; gα
]
are Lipschitz continuous in aαt and uniformly continuous with respect to
xαt .
Assumption 5 (A5). For any v ∈ R, α ∈ [0, 1] and any probability measure ensemble µG, the set
S (xαt , v) = argmin
aαt
[v
(
f˜
[
xαt , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; gα
])
(21)
+R(xαt , a
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)] (22)
is a singleton and the resulting aαt as a function of (x
α
t , v) is Lipschitz continuous in (x
α
t , v) and uniform with
respect to µGt and gα.
Theorem 5. Under assumptions (A1)-(A5), there exists a solution of the fixed-point equations (13) and (17) for
every t.
Proof. Under the assumption (A1)-(A5), it has been shown in [14] that there exists a solution to the GMFG
equations. Concurrently, Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 show that all GMFE can be found using backward recursion
for the finite and infinite horizon problems. This proves that under (A1)-(A5), there exists a solution of (13) and (17)
at every t.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we put forth a numerical example to showcase the proposed sequential decomposition in the
context of a system where the relative position of the players with respect to other players in a graph affects the
state of the player as well as their equilibrium strategies. We provide the following definition.
9Definition 1. Players α and β are statistically equivalent if φ(µ, γ, µG; gα) = φβ(µ, γ, µG; gβ).
Proposition 1. Mean field games with statistically equivalent players share the same mean field distribution and
µG can be replaced by µα for all α ∈ [0, 1].
For a complete, Erdos Re´nyi, symmetric stochastic block model, and random geometric graphon, every player
is statistically equivalent. Thus from proposition 1, the players share the same McKean-Vlasov (MKV) mean field
evolution function and so the same mean field.
Let n be the total number of statistically different players. Then µG can be replaced by {µ}i=1,...,n. With the
proposition we can represent the graphon mean field population state as
µG = {µ}i=1,...,n = µ ∀i (23)
A. Cybersecurity Example
We consider a cyber-security example where a cluster of nodes, facing a possible malware attack in a network,
do a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether to opt for repairing. The results of this analysis, however, could be
extended to many different cases like the vaccination in a population, entry and exit of firms, financial markets,
demand response in smart-grid and so on. The dynamics of each of the node is affected by the action of the
neighboring nodes connected with different measures captured in a network graph and represented as a graphon
function G. In this example, we assume different graphon functions and obtain the optimal policies using our
sequential decomposition algorithm assuming that the graphs are symmetric with respect to the participating agents.
In the model, the node can have two states xα ∈ X = {0, 1} representing healthy and infected node respectively.
Similarly, there are two actions at their disposal for each of the state aα ∈ A = {0, 1} which says whether the
nodes gets repaired with a cost or takes the risk by not undergoing repair. The chances of a node getting affected by
a malware attack depends on the population as well as the state of the neighboring nodes according to the graphon.
The dynamics of the model are given as
xαt+1 =
 xαt + (1− xαt )wαt if aαt = 00 otherwise (24)
where wαt ∈ {0, 1} is a binary random variable with
P{wαt = 1} =
∫
β∈[0,1]
∑
xβ∈X
f
(
xαt , a
α
t , x
β
)
g (α, β)µβt (x
β)d(xβ)dβ (25)
It is assumed that the value of P{wαt = 1} is q when the graph is fully connected i.e. g (α, η) = 1 and the mean
state of the neighbors µt(x
β) = 1. The value of q is assumed to be 0.9 for our simulation. The reward function is
given as
r (xαt , a
α
t , µt) = −kx
α
t − λa
α
t (26)
The value k represents the penalty if the node gets infected and λ represents the cost of repair. The values k and λ
are assumed as 0.3 and 0.2 respectively for our simulation. Here we implement our algorithm to derive equilibrium
10
for this problem by considering three popular network models to capture the interaction between the population.
We consider the following graphons:
1) Fully Connected Graph: The graphon function is given as
g(α, β) = 1 ∀α, β (27)
2) Erdo¨s Renyi Graph: The graphon function is given as
g(α, β) = p ∀α, β (28)
We assume a value p = 0.8 for our simulation.
3) Stochastic Block Model:The graphon function is given as
g(α, β) =
 p if α, β ≤ 0.5 or α, β ≥ 0.5q otherwise (29)
Here, p represents the intra-community interaction and is assumed as p = .9 for our simulation. Similarly,
q = .4 represents the inter-community interaction parameter.
4) Random Geometric graph: The graphon function is given as
g(α, β) = f(min(β − α, 1− β + α)) (30)
where f : [0, .5]→ [0, 1] is a non-increasing function, and in our simulation we assume it to be f(x) = e
x
0.5−x .
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
Fully Connected Graph
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
Erdos-Renyi Graph
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
Statistical Block Graph
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
Random Geometric Graph
Figure 1. Policy action at higher state for all graphons
Figure V-A shows the equilibrium policy derived for different graphons for the specific cyber-security example.
The policies differ as the interaction of the agents with their neighbors influences their strategies. Figure V-A gives
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Figure 2. Mean Field Evolution at different mean fields
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Figure 3. Convergence to GMFGs for all graphons with time
the relation between µt and µt+1 as presented in the (9). Figure V-A shows the equilibrium mean field or in the
specific case that we consider when with time, the a mean field distribution of 0.5 approaches different mean field
states for different graphons but with the same state dynamics.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider both finite and infinite horizon, large population dynamic game where each player is
affected by others through a graphon mean-field population state. We present a novel backward recursive algorithm
to compute non-stationary, signaling GMFG for such games, where each player’s strategy depends on its current
private type and the current graphon mean-field population state. The non-triviality in the problem is that the
update of population state is coupled to the strategies of the game, and is managed in the algorithm through
unique construction of the fixed-point equations (13),(17). We proved the existence of such equilibrium. Using this
algorithm, we considered a malware propagation problem where we numerically computed equilibrium strategies
of the players. In general, this algorithm be could instrumental in studying non-stationary equilibria in a number
of applications such as financial markets, social learning, renewable energy.
APPENDIX A
Proof. We prove (16) using induction and the results in Lemma 1, and 2 proved in Appendix B. For base case at
t = T , ∀i ∈ [N ], (µG1:T , x
α
1:T ) ∈ H
α
T , σ
α
E
σ˜αT σ˜
−α
T
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:T , xα1:T} = VT (µGT , xαT ) (31a)
≥ Eσ
α
T σ˜
−α
T
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:T , xα1:T} , (31b)
where (31a) follows from Lemma 2 and (31b) follows from Lemma 1 in Appendix B.
Let the induction hypothesis be that for t+ 1, ∀i ∈ [N ], µG1:t+1 ∈ (H
c
t+1), x
α
1:t+1 ∈ (X )
t+1, σα,
E
σ˜αt+1:T σ˜
−α
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t+1, xα1:t+1
}
(32a)
≥ Eσ
α
t+1:T σ˜
−α
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t+1, xα1:t+1
}
. (32b)
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Then ∀i ∈ [N ], (µG1:t, x
α
1:t) ∈ H
α
t , σ
α, we have
E
σ˜αt:T σ˜
−α
t:T
{
T∑
n=t
δn−t−1R(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
= Vt(µ
G
t , x
α
t ) (33a)
≥ Eσ
α
t σ˜
−α
t
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV αt+1(µ
G
t+1, X
α
t+1)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t} (33b)
= Eσ
α
t σ˜
−α
t
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)+
δEσ˜
α
t+1:T σ˜
−α
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, µGt+1, xα1:t, Xαt+1
}∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
(33c)
≥ Eσ
α
t σ˜
−α
t
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)+
δEσ
α
t+1:T σ˜
−α
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, µGt+1, xα1:t, Xαt+1
}∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
(33d)
= Eσ
α
t σ˜
−α
t
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)+
δEσ
α
t:T σ˜
−α
t:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, µGt+1, xα1:t, Xαt+1
}∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t} (33e)
= Eσ
α
t:T σ˜
−α
t:T
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
, (33f)
where (33a) follows from Lemma 2, (33b) follows from Lemma 1, (33c) follows from Lemma 2, (33d) follows
from induction hypothesis in (32b) and (33e) follows since the random variables involved in the right conditional
expectation do not depend on strategies σαt .
APPENDIX B
Lemma 1. ∀t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [N ], (µG1:t, x
α
1:t) ∈ H
α
t , σ
α
t
Vt(µ
G
t , x
α
t ) ≥ E
σαt σ˜
−α
t
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δVt+1(µ
G
t+1, X
α
t+1)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t} . (34)
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction.
Suppose the claim is not true for t. This implies ∃i, σ̂αt , µ̂
G
1:t, x̂
α
1:t such that
E
σ̂αt σ˜
−α
t
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δVt+1(µ
G
t+1, X
α
t+1)
∣∣µ̂G1:t, x̂α1:t} > Vt(µ̂Gt , x̂αt ). (35)
We will show that this leads to a contradiction. Construct
γ̂αt (a
α
t |x
α
t ) =
 σ̂αt (aαt |µ̂G1:t, x̂α1:t) xαt = x̂αtarbitrary otherwise. (36)
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Then for µ̂G1:t, x̂
α
1:t, we have
Vt(µ̂
G
t , x̂
α
t )
= max
γt(·|x̂αt )
E
γt(·|x̂
α
t )σ˜
−α
t
{
R(x̂αt , A
α
t , µ̂
G
t ) + δVt+1(φ(µ̂
G
t , γ˜t; g
α), Xαt+1)
∣∣µ̂Gt , x̂αt } , (37a)
≥ Eγ̂
α
t (·|x̂
α
t )σ˜
−α
t
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δVt+1(φ(µ̂
G
t , γ˜t; g
α), Xαt+1)
∣∣µ̂Gt , x̂αt } (37b)
=
∑
aαt ,x
α
t+1
{
R(x̂αt , a
α
t , µ̂
G
t ) + δVt+1(φ(µ̂
G
t , γ˜t; g
α), xαt+1)
}
γ̂t(a
α
t |x̂
α
t )Q
α(xαt+1|x̂
α
t , a
α
t , µ̂
G
t ; g
α)
=
∑
aαt ,x
α
t+1
{
R(x̂αt , a
α
t , µ̂
G
t ) + δVt+1(φ(µ̂
G
t , γ˜t; g
α), xαt+1)
}
σ̂t(a
α
t |µ̂
G
1:t, x̂
α
1:t)Q
α(xαt+1|x̂
α
t , a
α
t , µ̂
G
t ; g
α)
= Eσ̂
α
t σ˜
−α
t
{
R(x̂αt , a
α
t , µ̂
G
t ) + δVt+1(φ(µ̂
G
t , γ˜t), X
α
t+1; g
α)
∣∣µ̂G1:t, x̂α1:t} (37c)
> Vt(µ̂
G
t , x̂
α
t ), (37d)
where (37a) follows from definition of Vt in (14), (37c) follows from definition of γ̂
α
t and (37d) follows from (35).
However this leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 2. ∀i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ], (µG1:t, x
α
1:t) ∈ H
α
t ,
Vt(µ
G
t , x
α
t ) = E
σ˜αt:T σ˜
−α
t:T
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
. (38)
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction. For t = T ,
E
σ˜αT σ˜
−α
T
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:T , xα1:T} =∑
aα
T
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)σ˜αT (a
α
T |µ
G
T , x
α
T ) (39a)
= VT (µ
G
T , x
α
T ), (39b)
where (39b) follows from the definition of Vt in (14). Suppose the claim is true for t + 1, i.e., ∀i ∈ [N ], t ∈
[T ], (µG1:t+1, x
α
1:t+1) ∈ H
α
t+1
Vt+1(µ
G
t+1, x
α
t+1) = E
σ˜αt+1:T σ
−α
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t+1, xα1:t+1
}
. (40)
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Then ∀i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ], (µG1:t, x
α
1:t) ∈ H
α
t , we have
E
σ˜αt:T σ˜
−α
t:T
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
= Eσ˜
α
t:T σ˜
−α
t:T
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)
+δEσ˜
α
t:T σ˜
−α
t:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, µGt+1, xα1:t, Xαt+1
}∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
(41a)
= Eσ˜
α
t:T σ˜
−α
t:T
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)
+δEσ˜
α
t+1:T σ˜
−α
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, µGt+1, xα1:t, Xαt+1
}∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
(41b)
= Eσ˜
α
t:T σ˜
−α
t:T
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δVt+1(µ
G
t+1, X
α
t+1)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t} (41c)
= Eσ˜
α
T σ˜
−α
T
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δVt+1(µ
G
t+1, X
α
t+1)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t} (41d)
= Vt(µ
G
t , x
α
t ), (41e)
(41c) follows from the induction hypothesis in (40), (41d) follows because the random variables involved in
expectation, Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t , µ
G
t+1, X
α
t+1 do not depend on σ˜
α
t+1:Tσ
−α
t+1:T and (41e) follows from the definition of
Vt in (14).
APPENDIX C
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose for any equilibrium generating function θ that generates an MPE
σ˜, there exists t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [N ], µG1:t ∈ H
c
t , such that (13) is not satisfied for θ i.e. for γ˜t = θt[µ
G
t ] = σ˜t(·|µ
G
t , ·),
γ˜t(·|x
α
t ) 6∈ arg max
γt(·|xαt )
E
γt(·|x
α
t )
{
Rt(X
α
t , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + Vt+1(φ(µ
G
t , γ˜t; g
α), Xαt+1)
∣∣xαt , µGt } . (42)
Let t be the first instance in the backward recursion when this happens. This implies ∃ γ̂t such that
E
γ̂t(·|x
α
t )
{
Rt(X
α
t , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + Vt+1(φ(µ
G
t , γ˜t; g
α), Xαt+1)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t}
> Eγ˜t(·|x
α
t )
{
Rt(X
α
t , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + Vt+1(φ(µ
G
t , γ˜t; g
α), Xαt+1)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t} (43)
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This implies for σ̂t(·|µ
G
t , ·) = γ̂t,
E
σ˜t:T
{
T∑
n=t
Rn(X
α
n , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t−1, xα1:t
}
(44)
= Eσ˜
α
t ,σ˜
−α
t
{
Rt(X
α
t , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + Eσ˜
α
t+1:T σ˜
−α
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rn(X
α
n , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t−1, µGt+1, xα1:t, Xαt+1
}∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
(45)
= Eγ˜t(·|xt)γ˜
−α
t
{
Rt(X
α
t , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + Vt+1(φ(µ
G
t , γ˜t; g
α), Xαt+1)
∣∣µGt , xαt } (46)
< Eσ̂t(·|µ
G
t ,x
α
t )γ˜
−α
t
{
Rt(X
α
t , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + Vt+1(φ(µ
G
t , γ˜t; g
α), Xαt+1)
∣∣µGt , xt} (47)
= Eσ̂tσ˜
−α
t
{
Rt(X
α
t , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + Eσ˜
α
t+1:T σ˜
−α
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rn(X
α
n , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, µGt+1, xα1:t, Xαt+1
}∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
(48)
= Eσ̂t,σ˜
α
t+1:T σ˜
−α
t:T
{
T∑
n=t
Rn(X
α
n , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
, (49)
where (69) follows from the definitions of γ˜t and Lemma 2, (70) follows from (66) and the definition of σ̂t, (71)
follows from Lemma 1. However, this leads to a contradiction since σ˜ is an MPE of the game.
APPENDIX D
We divide the proof into two parts: first we show that the value function V is at least as big as any reward-to-go
function; secondly we show that under the strategy σ˜, reward-to-go is V . Note that hαt := (µ
G
1:t, x
α
1:t).
Part 1: For any i ∈ [N ], σα define the following reward-to-go functions
W σ
α
t (h
α
t ) = E
σα,σ˜−α
{
∞∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α) | hαt
}
(50a)
W
σα,T
t (h
α
t ) = E
σα,σ˜−α
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α) + δT+1−tV (µGT+1, X
α
T+1) | h
α
t
}
. (50b)
Since X ,A are finite sets the reward R is absolutely bounded, the reward-to-go W σ
α
t (h
α
t ) is finite ∀ i, t, σ
α, hαt .
For any i ∈ [N ], hαt ∈ H
α
t ,
V
(
µGt , x
α
t
)
−W σ
α
t (h
α
t ) =
[
V
(
µGt , x
α
t
)
−W σ
α,T
t (h
α
t )
]
+
[
W
σα,T
t (h
α
t )−W
σα
t (h
α
t )
]
(51)
Combining results from Lemmas 4 and 5 in Appendix D, the term in the first bracket in RHS of (51) is non-negative.
Using (50), the term in the second bracket is(
δT+1−t
)
E
σα,σ˜−α
{
−
∞∑
n=T+1
δn−(T+1)R(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α) + V (µGT+1, X
α
T+1) | h
α
t
}
. (52)
The summation in the expression above is bounded by a convergent geometric series. Also, V is bounded. Hence
the above quantity can be made arbitrarily small by choosing T appropriately large. Since the LHS of (51) does
not depend on T , which implies,
V
(
µGt , x
α
t
)
≥W σ
α
t (h
α
t ). (53)
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Part 2: Since the strategy the equilibrium strategy σ˜ generated in (19) is such that σ˜αt depends on h
α
t only
through µGt and x
α
t , the reward-to-go W
σ˜α
t , at strategy σ˜, can be written (with abuse of notation) as
W σ˜
α
t (h
α
t ) = W
σ˜α
t (µ
G
t , x
α
t ) = E
σ˜
{
∞∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α) | µGt , x
α
t
}
. (54)
For any hαt ∈ H
α
t ,
W σ˜
α
t (µ
G
t , x
α
t ) = E
σ˜
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δW σ˜
α
t+1
(
φ(µGt , θ[µ
G
t ], g
α)), Xαt+1
)
| µGt , x
α
t
}
(55a)
V (µGt , x
α
t ) = E
σ˜
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV
(
φ(µGt , θ[µ
G
t ], g
α)), Xαt+1
)
| µGt , x
α
t
}
. (55b)
Repeated application of the above for the first n time periods gives
W σ˜
α
t (µ
G
t , x
α
t ) = E
σ˜
{
t+n−1∑
m=t
δm−tR(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δnW σ˜
α
t+n
(
µGt+n, X
α
t+n
)
| µGt , x
α
t
}
(56a)
V (µGt , x
α
t ) = E
σ˜
{
t+n−1∑
m=t
δm−tR(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δnV
(
µGt+n, X
α
t+n
)
| µGt , x
α
t
}
. (56b)
Taking differences results in
W σ˜
α
t (µ
G
t , x
α
t )− V (µ
G
t , x
α
t ) = δ
n
E
σ˜
{
W σ˜
α
t+n
(
µGt+n, X
α
t+n
)
− V
(
µGt+n, X
α
t+n
)
| µGt , x
α
t
}
. (57)
Taking absolute value of both sides then using Jensen’s inequality for f(x) = |x| and finally taking supremum over
hαt reduces to
sup
hαt
∣∣W σ˜αt (µGt , xαt )− V (µGt , xαt )∣∣ ≤ δn sup
hαt
E
σ˜
{∣∣W σ˜αt+n(µGt+n, Xαt+n)− V (µGt+n, Xαt+n)∣∣ | µGt , xαt } . (58)
Now using the fact thatWt+n, V are bounded and that we can choose n arbitrarily large, we get suphαt |W
σ˜α
t (µ
G
t , x
α
t )−
V (µGt , x
α
t )| = 0.
APPENDIX E
In this section, we present three lemmas. Lemma 3 is intermediate technical results needed in the proof of
Lemma 4. Then the results in Lemma 4 and 5 are used in Appendix C for the proof of Theorem 3. The proof
for Lemma 3 below isn’t stated as it analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 from Appendix B, used in the proof of
Theorem 1 (the only difference being a non-zero terminal reward in the finite-horizon model).
Define the reward-to-go W
σα,T
t for any agent i and strategy σ
α as
W
σα,T
t (µ
G
1:t, x
α
1:t) = E
σα,σ˜−α
[ T∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α) + δT+1−tG(µGT+1, X
α
T+1) | µ
G
1:t, x
α
1:t
]
. (59)
Here agent i’s strategy is σα whereas all other agents use strategy σ˜−α defined above. Since X ,A are assumed to
be finite and G absolutely bounded, the reward-to-go is finite ∀ i, t, σα, µG1:t, x
α
1:t. In the following, any quantity
with a T in the superscript refers the finite horizon model with terminal reward G.
Lemma 3. For any t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [N ], µG1:t, x
α
1:t and σ
α,
V Tt (µ
G
t , x
α
t ) ≥ E
σα,σ˜−α
[
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV Tt+1
(
φ(µGt , θ[µ
G
t ], g
α), Xαt+1
)
| µG1:t, x
α
1:t
]
. (60)
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The result below shows that the value function from the backwards recursive algorithm is higher than any
reward-to-go.
Lemma 4. For any t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [N ], µG1:t, x
α
1:t and σ
α,
V Tt (µ
G
t , x
α
t ) ≥W
σα,T
t (µ
G
1:t, x
α
1:t). (61)
Proof. We use backward induction for this. At time T , using the maximization property from (13) (modified with
terminal reward G),
V TT (µ
G
T , x
α
T ) (62a)
△
= Eγ˜
α,T
T
(·|xαT ),γ˜
−α,T
T
[
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δG
(
φ(µGT , γ˜
T
T )), X
α
T+1
)
| µGT , x
α
T
]
(62b)
≥ Eγ
α,T
T
(·|xαT ),γ˜
−α,T
T
[
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δG
(
φ(µGT , γ˜
T
T )), X
α
T+1
)
| µG1:T , x
α
1:T
]
(62c)
= W σ
α,T
T (h
α
T ) (62d)
Here the second inequality follows from (13) and (14) and the final equality is by definition in (59).
Assume that the result holds for all n ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , T }, then at time t we have
V Tt (µ
G
t , x
α
t ) (63a)
≥ Eσ
α
t ,σ˜
−α
t
[
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV Tt+1
(
φ(µGt , θ[µ
G
t ], g
α), Xαt+1
)
| µG1:t, x
α
1:t
]
(63b)
≥ Eσ
α
t ,σ˜
−α
t
[
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δEσ
α
t+1:T ,σ˜
−α
t+1:T
[ T∑
n=t+1
δn−(t+1)R(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α) (63c)
+ δT−tG(µGT+1, X
α
T+1) | µ
G
1:t, x
α
1:t, µ
G
t+1, X
α
t+1
]
| µG1:t, x
α
1:t
]
= Eσ
α
t:T ,σ˜
−α
t:T
[ T∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n , µ
G
n ; g
α) + δT+1−tG(µGT+1, X
α
T+1) | µ
G
1:t, x
α
1:t
]
(63d)
= W σ
α,T
t (µ
G
1:t, x
α
1:t) (63e)
Here the first inequality follows from Lemma 3, the second inequality from the induction hypothesis, the third
equality follows since the random variables on the right hand side do not depend on σαt , and the final equality by
definition (59).
The following result highlights the similarities between the fixed-point equation in infinite-horizon and the
backwards recursion in the finite-horizon.
Lemma 5. Consider the finite horizon game with G ≡ V . Then V Tt = V , ∀ i ∈ [N ], t ∈ {1, . . . , T } satisfies the
backwards recursive construction stated above (adapted from (13) and (14)).
Proof. Use backward induction for this. Consider the finite horizon algorithm at time t = T , noting that V TT+1 ≡
G ≡ V ,
γ˜TT (· | x
α
T ) ∈ arg max
γT (·|xαT )
E
γT (·|x
α
T )
[
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV
(
φ(µGT , γ˜
T
t ), X
α
T+1
)
| µGT , x
α
T
]
(64a)
V TT (µ
G
T , x
α
T ) = E
γ˜TT (·|x
α
T )
[
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV
(
φ(µGT , γ˜
T
t ), X
α
T+1
)
| µGT , x
α
T
]
. (64b)
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Comparing the above set of equations with (17), we can see that the pair (V, γ˜) arising out of (17) satisfies the above.
Now assume that V Tn ≡ V for all n ∈ {t+1, . . . , T }. At time t, in the finite horizon construction from (13), (14),
substituting V in place of V Tt+1 from the induction hypothesis, we get the same set of equations as (64). Thus
V Tt ≡ V satisfies it.
APPENDIX F
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose for the equilibrium generating function θ that generates MPE σ˜,
there exists t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [N ], µG1:t ∈ H
c
t , such that (13) is not satisfied for θ i.e. for γ˜t = θ[µ
G
t ] = σ˜(·|µ
G
t , ·),
γ˜t 6∈ arg max
γt(·|xαt )
E
γt(·|x
α
t )
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV (φ(µGt , γ˜t), X
α
t+1)
∣∣xαt , µGt } . (65)
Let t be the first instance in the backward recursion when this happens. This implies ∃ γ̂t such that
E
γ̂t(·|xt)
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV (φ(µGt , γ˜t; g
α), Xαt+1)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t}
> Eγ˜t(·|xt)
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV (φ(µGt , γ˜t; g
α), Xαt+1)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t} (66)
This implies for σ̂(·|µGt , ·) = γ̂t,
E
σ˜
{
∞∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t−1, xα1:t
}
(67)
= Eσ˜
α
t ,σ˜
−α
t
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)+
E
σ˜αt+1:T σ˜
−α
t+1:T
{
∞∑
n=t+1
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t−1, µGt+1, xα1:t, Xαt+1
}∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
(68)
= Eγ˜t(·|xt)γ˜
−α
t
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV (φ(µGt , γ˜t; g
α), Xαt+1)
∣∣µGt , xαt } (69)
< Eσ̂t(·|µ
G
t ,x
α
t )γ˜
−α
t
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α) + δV (φ(µGt , γ˜t; g
α), Xαt+1)
∣∣µGt , xαt } (70)
= Eσ̂tσ˜
−α
t
{
R(Xαt , A
α
t , µ
G
t ; g
α)+
E
σ˜αt+1:T σ˜
−α
t+1:T
{
∞∑
n=t+1
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, µGt+1, xα1:t, Xαt+1
}∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
(71)
= Eσ̂t,σ˜
α
t+1:T σ˜
−α
t:T
{
∞∑
n=t
δn−tR(Xαn , A
α
n, µ
G
n ; g
α)
∣∣µG1:t, xα1:t
}
, (72)
where (69) follows from the definitions of γ˜t and Appendix D, (70) follows from (66) and the definition of σ̂t,
(71) follows from Appendix D. However, this leads to a contradiction since σ˜ is a GMFE of the game.
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